We present a constructive formalization of the Myhill-Nerode theorem on the minimization of nite automata that follows the account in Hopcroft and Ullman's book Formal Languages and Their Relation to Automata. We chose to formalize this theorem because it illustrates many points critical to formalization of computational mathematics, especially the extraction of an important algorithm from a proof as a method of knowing that the algorithm is correct. It also gave us an opportunity to experiment with a constructive implementation of quotient sets.
Introduction

Background
It is widely believed that we know how to formalize large tracts of classical mathematics | namely write in the style of Bourbaki 4] using some version of set theory and ll in all the details. Indeed, the Journal of Formalized Mathematics publishes results formalized in set theory and checked by the Mizar system. Despite this belief and the many formalizations accomplished, massive formalization is not a fait accompli; many challenges remain in such areas as the organization of large databases of mathematics and the raising of the level of automation. In contrast, there is no general agreement on how to formalize computational mathematics. Even worse, few people appreciate that this is a signi cant new problem (see 5] ). Our interest is in examining whether some kind of constructive type theory is an appropriate formalism. There are two immediately-appealing aspects of constructive type theories. Firstly, they have built-in a functional programming language in which algorithms can be expressed. Secondly, propositions can be read as claiming the existence of functional programs and data, and if some proof can be given of a proposition, the corresponding programs and data can be automatically synthesized (or sometimes we say extracted) from the proof. For example, from the proof of 8x 2 S: 9y 2 T: P(x; y), we can synthesize a functional program that, when given any element s of type S as data, can compute some t of type T such that proposition P(s; t) holds. We sometimes call the programs and data that can be synthesized from proofs of some proposition the computational content of the proposition. There is a tradeo in gaining this extra expressivity: fewer truths can be proven in logics based on constructive type theories than in classical logic.
For example, the propositions P , ::P, and P _:P are no longer true for arbitrary propositions P. For introductory material on constructive type theory, consult 30] or 10]. The particular constructive type theory we are working with is similar to one of Martin-L of's 24], and is implemented in the Nuprl proof development system 6, 20] . Nuprl provides an environment for assembling theories consisting of de nitions, theorems, and proofs. It also has an interpreter for executing the functional programs that users write and that are synthesized from proofs. Previous topics we have experimented with in Nuprl include elementary number theory 17], elementary analysis 9], and the algebra of polynomials 20].
Choice of Topic
Automata theory is an appealing topic for formalization because of its central role in computer science. Recently, we have been considering whether we could formalize a whole book on automata theory such as Hopcroft and Ullman's Formal Languages and their Relation to Automata 15] . Such a formalization could have signi cant pedagogical value: it could serve as a novel hypertext reference for students studying automata theory, and would stand as a corpus of familiar examples for any computer scientist interested in formalization techniques. We report in this article on a preliminary step in this direction, namely, the formalization in Nuprl of the Myhill-Nerode theorem on the existence and uniqueness of minimum nite automata. We based the formalization on the presentation in the book cited above. We chose this theorem because it is one of the rst signi cant theorems in the book, and because it involves computationally interesting constructions. Automata theory was previously explored in Nuprl by Christoph Kreitz in 1986 22] . In particular, he proved the pumping lemma for nite automata. We saw that we needed this lemma for our constructivization of the MyhillNerode theorem, and so reproved it using Nuprl's current tactic collection. We therefore could compare the currently achievable level of automation with that achievable in 1986. An under-explored aspect of Nuprl's type theory is its novel quotient types (see Section 4.3). Jackson, for example, had experimented with these previously 20], but we still didn't have much experience with how best to reason e ciently with them. The heart of the Myhill-Nerode theorem involves a quotient construction, and so provided a good opportunity to gain more experience.
Value of the Formalization
Readers can evaluate the formal text on the Web that resulted from our formalization e orts. It is possible to directly judge whether our de nitions are faithful to Hopcroft and Ullman's, whether the formal de nitions help clarify the concepts, whether the proofs are su ciently readable and informative, and whether the availability of detail about all proof steps is useful. The formal material also provided the underpinning for this article in that our de nitions and proof summaries refer to the complete formal library. The material can be the foundation for other documents that explain the detailed proofs. We have not yet produced such documents for the automata library (but see Section 9), however, there are examples of this genre of writing in the Formal-Courseware section of the Nuprl home page. For example, Stuart Allen has produced a hybrid style of formal and informal proof to accompany the basic theorems about functions proved by Paul Jackson and used extensively in this formalization. There are other aspects and by-products of our formalization that cannot be directly evaluated by reading the formal text; they require experience with the system. In this category is the experience of con dence in the results that comes from learning to trust Nuprl. We know that reading results checked by both a human and a machine raises con dence in their correctness, similar to the added con dence gained by having a trusted colleague check a result. Another value of the formalization is the interactivity provided by the underlying system. For example, Nuprl can show dependencies among theorems and de nitions, and it can execute algorithms extracted from proofs. Users can experiment with alternate proofs and can observe the e ect on the extracted programs. In addition to the readable and highly reliable interactive formal text, the formalization has created an interesting digital artifact. The formal theory becomes an object that we can manipulate, measure, transform and explore. To experience these capabilities, one must learn to use a system like Nuprl.
Interpretations of the Mathematics
Nuprl's type theory can be interpreted in several ways. In the semantics given by Allen 1], all functions are computable. The type theory is therefore compatible with recursive mathematics in which all functions are given by Turing machines. Every theorem in Nuprl can be seen as a theorem of recursive mathematics, but the converse is not true; the type theory is sufciently weak that non-classical results in recursive mathematics, such as that every function from R to R is continuous, are not provable. Howe has given a set-theoretic interpretation of Nuprl's type theory that shows that every theorem provable in Nuprl can be read as a theorem of classical mathematics 19] . This interpretation includes all non-computational set-theoretic functions in the denotation of function types. Having both classical and recursive interpretations makes Nuprl a suitable tool for formalizing constructive mathematics in the style advocated by Bishop 2 ].
Electronic Access to Formalization
The key ideas of the formalization are presented in this article in a selfcontained way. To nd out more, the reader is invited to browse the full formalization on the World Wide Web. Start by visiting the Nuprl project's home page at URL http://www.cs.cornell.edu/Info/Projects/NuPrl/nuprl.html From there, the reader can access hypertext presentations of both the work presented in this article and other more recent work in automata theory. Nuprl itself is free software that can be obtained from this web site. It runs on a freely-available version Allegro Common Lisp under Linux as well as free CMU Common Lisp under Unix.
Related work
A non-constructive set-theoretic formalization of minimization theorems for Moore and Mealy automata has been done in the Mizar system 21]. This closely follows a presentation in Denning, Dennis Qualitz 8] . Theorems asserting the equivalence between deterministic (DFA) and nondeterministic (NFA) nite state automata, and between NFAs with and without epsilon moves, were proven in Nqthm 31] , and subsequently in PVS 28] . These formalizations were based on theorems 2.1 and 2.2 in 16]. Notably, a aw was found in the textbook proof of theorem 2.2. The formation of DFA states from sets of NFA states was signi cantly more complicated in the constructive Nqthm proofs than the non-constructive PVS proofs. Part of the di culty in the Nqthm proofs was in modelling nite sets using lists, and handling the equality of lists considered as sets. We wouldn't expect to have this di culty in Nuprl because, as shown in 20], we can take advantage of Nuprl's quotient type to appropriately rede ne the equality relation on lists. Quotient types have been explored in the ECC constructive type theory by Hofmann 14] , and probably most of the development presented in this article could be straightforwardly formalized in the LEGO mechanization of ECC 27] . One major di erence between ECC and Nuprl is that, in ECC, both explicitly written and synthesized programs must be embellished with parts that are unimportant for computation, but necessary for proofs of correctness.
Outline
In Section 2 we present the basic ideas from Nuprl needed for this article. Section 3 de nes the notion of a formal language, and Section 4 provides the preliminaries on automata. Section 5 proves the Myhill-Nerode theorem, and Section 6 presents a corollary which makes explicit the construction and properties of the minimum automata introduced in the course of proving the Myhill-Nerode theorem. Section 7 discusses various issues that came up, Section 8 summarizes our results, and Section 9 presents our conclusions and outlines future work. Finally, Appendix A provides an index for notation. Recursive functions are created using the Y recursion combinator, which is de nable since Nuprl's computation language is untyped. Immediately after introducing a recursive de nition, we prove a well-formedness lemma showing that evaluation of the de nition on arguments in speci ed types always terminates and gives a result in a speci ed type. The lemma for @ is`8 A : U: 8u; v : A list: u@v 2 A list:
Propositions and Universes
In so-called \classical" accounts of logic, a proposition has a truth value in B , and propositions can be treated as boolean expressions. We are interested not only in the truth value of propositions, but also in their computational sense; how they can be seen as speci cations for programs. To support this computational view, it is necessary for us to have a type P of propositions distinct from B .
There are two distinguished atomic propositions, > the canonically true one and ? the canonically false one. Given propositions P; Q we can form compounds in the usual way:
P^Q for \P and Q ", P _ Q for \P or Q", P ) Q for \P implies Q" also written \P only if Q", P , Q for \P if and only if Q" also written \P i Q". Negation, :P, is de ned as P )?. A propositional function on a type T is any map P 2 T ! P: Given such a P, then we can form the propositions: 8x:T: P x \for all x of type A; P x holds," 9x:T: P x \for some x of type A; P x holds." Associated with every type T is the atomic equality relation x = y in T. The de nition of this equality is given with each type. Often, the in T is dropped; it usually can be inferred from consideration of x or y.
Types in Nuprl are members of universe types. Nuprl has a hierarchy of universe types to avoid the problem of a universe type being a member of itself. There happens also to be a corresponding hierarchy of proposition types. For the purposes of this article, it is su cient that we use U to denote some typical universe type and P to denote some typical type of propositions. See 6] or 20] for fuller accounts of Nuprl's logic and universe types.
Subtypes
If T is a type and P 2 T ! P is a propositional function, then fx:A j P xg denotes the type of all elements of A satisfying P. Looking at this subset type from a constructive point of view, it's important to note that when we assume that we have some element a in this type, we don't have any access to the computational content of the the proposition P x, even though we know it to be true. Further discussion of the subset type can be found in 6, 20, 25] as well as in Section 2.8.
Finiteness
A predicate asserting that a type T is nite is Constructively, if we assume Fin(T ), we are assuming that T's cardinality and the computable functions f and g are available for use. Likewise, if we are proving Fin(T ), we have to give T's cardinality and produce suitable computable functions f and g.
Because the predicate Fin(T ) has signi cant computational content, it is not that constructively useful to form the type of all nite types fT : UjFin (T )g using the subset type; if we know some type is in this collection of nite types, we still have no way of nding out its size, or enumerating its contents.
Languages and their Representation
Alphabets and Languages
Hopcroft and Ullman begin their book with the question: What is a language? Their answer starts with a de nition of an alphabet. They de ne an alphabet to be any nite set of symbols. The exact structure of symbols is unimportant, so we take an alphabet to be any type Alph, and we always assume Fin(Alph). As noted in Section 2.8, a consequence of niteness is that the equality relation on Alph is decidable. In Hopcroft and Ullman we read that a sentence over an alphabet is any string of nite length composed of symbols from the alphabet. We use lists of type Alph list to represent strings over an alphabet Alph. We choose to reverse the order of alphabet symbols, so the string abc is represented by the list c:b:a:nil . Hopcroft and Ullman de ne a language to be a set of sentences over an alphabet. In Nuprl's type theory, though types super cially resemble sets, they are not as versatile. For example, one cannot take the union or intersection of two arbitrary types, and a type membership predicate can be awkward to reason with. So, instead of considering a language L over an alphabet Alph to be a subtype of Alph list, we consider L to be a propositional function over Alph list, that is, a function of type Alph list ! P.
When sets are represented in Nuprl's type theory as propositional functions over some common domain type, common set operations and predicates are straightforward to de ne and use. We let Language(Alph), the type of languages over alphabet Alph, be an abbreviation for Alph list ! P.
We de ne two languages to be equal, written L = M, just when for all x in Alph list, L x , M x.
Representations of Languages
Our de nition of a language as a propositional function L 2 Alph list ! P captures the intuition that to know a language is to know the criteria for saying when a sentence is in it. To say x is in the language L is to know how to prove L x. This agrees with Hopcroft and Ullman; they are concerned with certain special ways of knowing L x. One especially simple kind of representation of L arises when the proposition L x is decidable, i.e. when there is a function R L 2 Alph list ! B such that
We call the function R L a language recognizer, and the language in this case is said to be decidable or recursive. The language accepted by A is de ned by a similar function which returns a proposition rather than a boolean. Using the " function which converts a boolean to the corresponding proposition, L(A), the language accepted by A, is de ned as
Equivalence Relations and Quotient Types
Prior to presenting the Myhill-Nerode theorem, Hopcroft and Ullman give a brief introduction to equivalence relations and how they partition the sets they are over into equivalence classes. They take a binary relation on a set S to be a set of pairs of elements of S. As with representing languages (see Section 3.1), we nd it more convenient to represent relations as characteristic functions: we consider a binary relation on a type S to be a function of type S ! S ! P (= S ! (S ! P)). To express that elements x and y of type S are related by a binary relation R of type S ! S ! P, we use both pre x application notation R x y and in x notation x R y.
In the Myhill-Nerode theorem, an automaton is constructed that uses the equivalence classes of an equivalence relation as the states of an automaton. This is problematic constructively, because the equivalence classes in question have in nite size, and we would like to have nite representations of states on which we can de ne computable transition functions. The obvious solution is to use some element of an equivalence class as a representative for the whole class. We do this with the help of Nuprl's quotient types. Given a type S and an equivalence relation E on S, the quotient type S==E has the same members as S, but has as its associated equality relation the relation E rather than the equality relation associated with S.
In Nuprl's type theory, for a function f to be in a type S ! T, it must respect the equalities associated with S and T. Speci cally, if the equalities are = S and = T respectively, we have f x = T f y whenever x = S y. If E is an equivalence relation on S, and we want to show that f also has type S==E ! T, we have to check that f x = T f y whenever x E y.
The quotient type S==E behaves much like a type of the equivalence classes of E. Often when set-theoretically de ning a function with a set of equivalence classes as domain, the function mentions representatives of equivalence classes, and it is necessary to check that the value of the function is independent of the particular choice of representatives. With the quotient type S==E as domain of a function in Nuprl's type theory, the rules for function type inhabitation enforce a corresponding constraint. In presentations of quotient types from Nuprl theories, we occasionally use the notation x; y : S==(x E y) for the type S==E. This more verbose notation is useful when the primary notation for relation E includes its arguments.
Finite Index Equivalence Relations
In set theory, an equivalence relation E on a set S is is said to be of nite index if E has a nite number of equivalence classes. In Nuprl's type theory, we express that an equivalence relation E on type S has nite index by saying Fin(S==E), that is, the quotient type S==E is in one-one correspondence with f0 : : : k ? 1g for some non-negative number k.
This de nition works because the functions de ning the bijection between S==E and f0 : : : k ? 1g must respect E. Note that when S is in nite, is is possible for S==E to be nite, even though S and S==E have the same elements.
Equivalence Relations on Strings
We introduce here a couple of de nitions that are useful for stating the Myhill-Nerode theorem.
De nition: An equivalence relation E on Alph list is called extension in- 
Hopcroft and Ullman Version
The statement and proof of the Myhill-Nerode theorem here is taken almost verbatim from 15]. A few changes have been made to make the notation more similar to that used in the formal development. The de nitions of what it means for an equivalence relation to be extension invariant and of the equivalence relation induced by a language can be found in Section 4.4. Proof (1) ) (2) . 1 Assume that L is accepted by M = (K; Alph; ; q 0 ; F). Let R be the equivalence relation x R y if and only if (q 0 ; x) = (q 0 ; y). R is extension invariant since, for any z, if (q 0 ; x) = (q 0 ; y), then (q 0 ; z@x) = (q 0 ; z@y): The index of R is nite since the index is at most the number of states in K. Furthermore, L is the union of those equivalence classes which include an element x such that (q 0 ; x) is in F. (2) ) (3) .
We show that any equivalence relation R satisfying statement (2) is a renement of the equivalence relation R(L) induced by L; that is, every equivalence class of R is entirely contained in some equivalence class of R(L). Thus the index of R(L) cannot be greater than the index of R and so is nite. Assume that x R y. Then since R is extension invariant, for each z in Alph list, z@x R z@y, and thus z@y is in L if and only if z@x is in L. Thus xR(L)y, and hence, the equivalence class of x in R is contained in the equivalence class of x in R(L). We conclude that each equivalence class of R is contained within some equivalence class of R(L). The function g here acts as the characteristic function for the set of equivalence classes of the relation R whose union gives the language L. As remarked in Section 3.1, it is often more straightforward in Nuprl's type theory to represent sets as characteristic functions than as types. Note that the Nuprl quotient type Alph list==R still contains elements of Alph list as members, so it is legitimate to pass the function g an element l of Alph list as an argument.
In requiring that g be boolean (B ) valued rather than proposition (P) valued, we are augmenting the statement (2) of the theorem with the requirement that membership in the language L be decidable. This augmentation is necessary for the constructive proofs of the other parts of the theorem. Proof 1. As with the Hopcroft and Ullman proof, R x y is de ned as Auto(x) = Auto(y). Showing R is an equivalence relation and is extension invariant is straightforward.
Finiteness of Alph list==R is argued by noting that Alph list==R is
isomorphic to the set of accessible states, which is a subset of St. The niteness argument is rst carried out abstractly by proving the lemmà 8T; S :U: 8f :T ! S: Fin(S)^(8s:S: Dec(9t:T: f t = s)) ) Fin(x; y:T==(f x = f y))
which is then instantiated with T being Alph list, S being St, and f being the function l: Auto(l).
In using this lemma, the precondition 8s:St: Dec(9t:Alph list: Auto(t) = s) has to be discharged. Read constructively, this precondition requires that, for any state s, it is possible to compute whether or not s is accessible, and further, if s is accessible, it must be possible to compute some string t that, when input to the automaton, puts the automaton into state s.
The precondition is proven with the help of a corollary of the pumping lemma which states that in searching for a string that puts an automaton in a certain state, it is only necessary to try strings whose length is not greater than the number of states of the automaton.
3. We de ne g on Alph list==R to be tt exactly when F(Auto(x)) = tt, i.e. g x = F(Auto(x)). That g is functional wrt R follows directly from the de nition of R. is suppressed, since A can be inferred from considering the type of L. We establish straightforwardly that R(L) is an equivalence relation.
The formal statement of (2) ) (3) Note that here both statements (2) and (3) of Hopcroft and Ullman have been augmented with a requirement that membership in L be decidable.
The augmentation of (3) is necessary for the proof of (3) ) (1) . Proof
The argument that R is a re nement of R(L) follows the Hopcroft and Ullman argument and is completely straightforward.
To show that therefore the index of R(L) is no larger than the index of R, we could instantiate a lemma of form Quotient Index Lemma 1. If P and Q are binary relations over a type T, and P is a re nement of Q (x P y ) x Q y for any x and y), and the index of T==P is some natural number n, then the index of T==Q is some natural number m such that m n.
For this lemma to be constructive, a precondition requiring S to be a decidable relation needs to be added. Proving this lemma is tedious; it involves giving the explicit construction of a bijection between f0 : : : m ? 1g and T==S given a bijection between f0 : : : n?1g and T==R. It turns out to be simpler to prove a lemma of form: Quotient Index Lemma 2. If Q is a decidable binary relation over a type T, and the index of T is some natural number n, then the index of T==Q is some natural number m such that m n. A remaining precondition of Quotient Index Lemma 2 is to show that R 0 (g), or equivalently R(L), is a decidable relation. This is not immediately obvious: Since x R(L) y i z@x R z@y for every z, it seems that we have to try an in nite number of z to compute if x R(L) y true. (Note that we can test if z@x R z@y since R is decidable.) Again, the pumping lemma is of help; it shows that it is su cient to only consider every z of length up to the number of states of our automata M which accepts L. Since Alph is nite, there are only a nite number of z to try. (3) ) (1) The formal statement of the theorem is: , here we use a function that works on representatives of equivalence classes. Speci cally, given an element x of Alph list and an element a of Alph, we de ne (Auto) x a to be the list a:x. For the start state I(Auto), we use the empty list nil, and for F(Auto) we use a boolean-valued version of the characteristic function L (remember that we represent languages using characteristic functions rather than subtypes).
Qed
Formalizing
A boolean-valued version of L exists because we have as an assumption that L is decidable.
In type-checking each of these components of Auto, we check that the de nition of Auto is consistent. For example, we check that (Auto) has type 
Qed 6 State Minimization
We discuss in this section a corollary to the Myhill-Nerode theorem that explicitly states the existence and uniqueness of a minimum nite automaton for any language accepted by some nite automaton.
Textbook Proof
The presentation here is taken almost verbatim from 15, p29]. The main change is to adopt the notation for strings used in the Nuprl development. 
Formalization of Minimization Theorem
First we make a few de nitions. As earlier, let Alph be an alphabet, St be a type for states, and Auto be some automaton over Alph We show that MinAuto(Auto) has type Automata(Alph; MinSt(Auto)). These de nitions make explicit the constructions implicit in our proof of the MyhillNerode theorem. With the help of various auxiliary lemmas from the Myhill-Nerode development, we prove such theorems as that MinSt(Auto) is a nite type and MinAuto(Auto) accepts the same language as Auto. We split our statement and proof of the minimization theorem into two parts. It is important to note here that the de nitions of MinSt(Auto) and MinAuto(Auto) depend only on the language accepted by Auto, not on any particular structure of Auto. Without this observation, the two main statements will not be seen to claim what we intend them to claim. The two statements are 1. The statement that the minimum automaton really has the smallest number of states of any automata accepting the same language is 8Alph:U: Fin(Alph) ) 8St :U: Fin(St) ) 8Auto :Automata(Alph; St): jStj jMinSt(Auto)j:
Here we use the de nition jSj jTj == 9f : S ! T: Surj (S; T; f); that is, a type S is at least as large as a type T if there exists a surjective function from S to T. When S is non-empty and T is empty, this predicate is false, whereas one would ideally want it to be true. We don't need to be concerned with this pathological case since types of states always include initial states.
Proof
Most of the argument here is already gone over in the Myhill-Nerode proof. In a few cases we have to prove some new intermediate lemmas that make various facts more explicit. Bij (S1; S2; f) (8s:S1:8a:Alph: f ( (A1) s a) = (A2) (f s) a) f I(A1) = I(A2) (8s:S1: F(A1) s = F(A2) (f s) to say that automata A1 and A2 are isomorphic. This de nition follows the pattern of de nitions of isomorphisms for algebraic structures. Hopcroft and Ullman omit the de nition entirely, no doubt on the grounds that it is the obvious one to use. Bij (S1; S2; f) is the proposition that function f from type S1 to type S2 is a bijection. The de nition of takes S1, S2, and Alph as parameters, but the display of these is suppressed because they can easily be inferred from consideration of the types of A1 and A2.
As with the Hopcroft and Ullman proof, we argue that we can assume without loss of generality that Auto is connected. We then use our analogue of their construction of the identi cation function f for the isomorphism. Hopcroft and Ullman state without proof that this identi cation is consistent. We need ourselves to ll in the tedious but routine steps of proof showing that the identi cation function has all the properties that make it an isomorphism. Qed 7 Discussion 7.1 Structuring the de nition of automata Our parameterization of the type of automata by both an alphabet and a type of states is inelegant (See Section 4.1). Parameterization by an alphabet has its merits, but it is clear that the type of states ought to be paired with the transition function, the initial state, and the set of nal states.
Constructively, a full speci cation of an automata also requires evidence that the state type is nite. One solution is to have automata over a nite alphabet be tuples of form hFinSt; ; I; Fi where , I, and F are as before, and FinSt is an element of a type of` nite types', of four-tuples of form hT; n; f; gi, where T is a type, n is the size of T, and f and g de ne an isomorphism between T and Nn.
A similar solution involves writing the type of nite types as
(This is the notation for Nuprl's dependent product type, sometimes called a type.) From the point of view of classical mathematics this is ill-formed, a proposition Fin(T ), is being used in a position where a type is expected. However, in constructive type theory, this is well-formed because propositions are types. Elements of Fin(T ) are tuples of form hn; f; g; i, and elements of T :U Fin(T ) are tuples of form hT; hn; f; g; ii.
The here is a term witnessing the proposition that f and g form an isomorphism. Such witnesses can form signi cant clutter, and there are standard techniques, for example using subset types, to de ne propositions carefully so that they have minimal or no such witnesses. We avoided taking this approach, using Fin(T ) as a type, partly because of a wish to keep a straightforward classical reading. Perhaps though this is not important when so many of our concerns are with constructivity.
Use of quotient types
Due to the richness of Nuprl's type theory, type-checking is undecidable. In practice, heuristics help carry out most simpler type checking tasks completely automatically. However, Nuprl's quotient types introduce a new dimension of variability into the problem. Frequently we use a function with domain type T where a function with domain type T==E is expected, and we then repeatedly get proof obligations to show that the function respects E.
We realize that we need to introduce a discipline for use of quotient types, where, as much as possible, such problems are localized to the right-handside of de nitions that are type-checked just once, and then always exploited in proofs with the help of characterizing lemmas, rather than de nition expansion. We now have several similar proposals for such a discipline, but didn't have the time to try one in this formalization. One key aspect of these proposals is that injections into quotient types are always explicitly tagged. This helps both the type checker in its type-inference, and the reader in understanding what terms in Nuprl's computation language are denoting.
For example, if x is of type T and E is an equivalence relation over T, we might have the injection of x into T==E written as x]fT==Eg. For projections out of quotient types, we might have a projection operator written qproj fT==Eg(f) that takes a function f of type T ! S, and turns it into a function of type T==E ! S. The type checking conditions for qproj would include the requirement that f be shown to respect E.
Using these injection and projection operators does not free us from checking that equivalence relations are respected, but it does make the location of those checks more predictable. Analogous operators are required when quotient types are implemented in strongly-typed type theories such as ECC 14] , and when working with quotient structures in set theory.
Inadequacies in construction of the minimum automaton
A hard-to-understand de nition in this formalization is that of the MinAuto function (see Section 6.2). There, the intended meaning of the state transition function mapping equivalence classes to equivalence classes is only apparent when we look at the type the function is supposed to have. its meaning is more immediately evident. Here we have used the quotient type injection and projection operators described in Section 7.1 as well as type annotations on the lambda terms, again to help both readability and typechecking. Another perhaps more serious defect of our construction of MinAuto(Auto) is that it is computationally trivial. If we imagine applying MinAuto(Auto) to some input string, then it does nothing more than copy that string, and pass it to Auto to check if it should be accepted. Creating a minimization function that actually does the work of computing a minimum automaton is not di cult, though we have not carried this out yet. We need to de ne a type of automata, MinAuto 0 say, in which automata are represented by nite data structures (integers, pairs, and lists, for example), not functions. The key is to exploit the function we can synthesize from the proof of Fin(MinAuto(Auto)). Given Auto as argument, this function can compute the size n of the minimum automaton accepting the language Auto accepts and can provide mapping functions between MinSt(Auto) and Nn. Using these mapping functions, we can construct a function that, when evaluated on argument MinAuto(Auto), returns the nite data structures for a minimum automaton that accepts the same language as Auto.
Computational complexity of synthesized algorithms
With the proofs as we initially completed them, the time complexity of several extracted functions, including the size function described in Section 7.3, was exponential in the number of states. Aleksey Nogin at Cornell has recently reworked some of the proofs and introduced alternate auxiliary functions to reduce the complexity of the size function to a low-order polynomial. His work is viewable at the Nuprl web site (see Section 1.5). Folowing the approach described in Section 7.3, we should be able to extend Nogin's work so that we can synthesize an automata miniminization function of low polynomial time complexity.
Summary of Results
We were successful in formalizing the Myhill-Nerode theorem in constructive type theory. We did not nd errors in the statement or proof of the theorem in Hopcroft and Ullman. We did note Hopcroft and Ullman's elision of more-routine de nitions and proofs. For example, they employ but do not de ne an isomorphism relation on automata, and they claim but do not prove that a mapping between the sets of states of two automata is an automata isomorphism. To make the Myhill-Nerode theorem constructively provable, we needed to add conditions on the decidability of language membership to two of the three equivalent propositions in its statement. Constructivity considerations when reasoning about niteness forced us to consider how various automata properties can be computed. For example, by a combination of explicit introduction, and synthesis from appropriate constructive proofs, we introduced functions for { determining whether a state of an automaton is accessible, and, if so, what input string would put the automaton in that state, { testing whether two states are equivalent.
Such functions can form the core of a function for carrying out the minimization procedure. Initially they had time complexity exponential in the number of states, but, in ongoing work, we have introduced alternate functions with low-order polynomial complexity.
Conclusions and Future Work
With this article and the accompanying online material, we have a presentation of a piece of mathematics that is completely precise and that can be viewed at di ering levels of detail. We have argued that such presentations are superior to textbook only presentations, and we believe that we have begun to demonstrate this. At Cornell we are currently experimenting with other examples of such formally-grounded explanations. We have already formalized other parts of Hopcroft and Ullman, including account of grammars and of nondeterministic automata. We judge that it would be possible to formalize Chapters 1{9 with our four person team in about eighteen months. The collaboration methods we have learned would extend to larger teams. It would be especially interesting to collaborate with other theorem proving systems as Howe and his colleagues are doing with HOL and Nuprl 19, 18] . Much of a classical treatment of languages can easily be re-interpreted constructively. It would be especially fruitful to collaborate with teams using other constructive provers such as Alf, Coq, Lego, or Isabelle with its Martin-L of-type-theory object logic. Although these provers are based on di erent formalizations of constructive mathematics, they all share the critical properties that computational notions can be expressed and that programs can be synthesized from proofs. One weak point of our online presentation is the readability of proofs. We see no reason why online formal proofs should not be at least as clear as any informal proofs. Unlike many other provers, Nuprl maintains a proof tree datastructure that already assists us in generating comprehensible presentations of proofs. Ideas we are currently exploring to improve readability include the grouping of lower level tactic sequences under user supplied comments and the suppression of less-important proof branches. We are also following the work of the Centaur group to make proofs more readable 3, 29], and we expect to use the modularity feature of the Nuprl-Light re ner 13] to help us better structure theories.
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A Index for Notation
The numbers on the right refer to pages where the notation is rst introduced. 
